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Well Isn't That Special? The Supreme Court's Immediate
Purpose of Restricting the Doctrine of Special Needs in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures;1 unfortunately, it does not address the United States
Supreme Court's unreasonable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In
the absence of this latter prohibition, the Court created the special
needs exception2 to the requirement that searches must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant and probable cause After approving several
searches as justified by the existence of " 'special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, [making] the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable,' "-4 the Court encountered
a number of searches that it did not sanction.5 The opinions that
struck down those searches implicitly curtailed the applicability of the
doctrine.6 The most recent and most fatal denial of the doctrine of
special needs came in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.7
In Ferguson, the Court struck down a state hospital's policy of
screening pregnant women for the presence of cocaine and reporting
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See generally George M. Dery III, The Coarsening of Our National Manners: The
Supreme Court's Failure to Protect the Privacy Interests of Our Nation's Schoolchildren-
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 693 (1995) (critiquing the
special needs doctrine); Sean Anderson, Comment, Individual Privacy Interests and the
"Special Needs" Analysis for Involuntary Drug and HIV Tests, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 119
(1998) (discussing the evolution of the doctrine).
3. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) ("The Fourth Amendment
proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures and it is a cardinal principle that
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))).
4. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting Griffin
v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,873 (1987)).
5. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (upholding random
drug testing of student athletes); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (upholding urinalysis of railway
employees); Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (upholding
urinalyses of drug interdiction officers); Griffin v. United States, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987)
(upholding a search of a probationer's home for a weapon).
6. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,78-96 (2001) (striking down urine
screenings of pregnant women when evidence of cocaine use was turned over to police);
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23 (1997) (striking down mandatory drug testing of
candidates for state political offices in Georgia).
7. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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positive results to the police in order to protect their offspring.' In
doing so, the Court departed from its usual practice of analyzing the
ultimate goal of a search9 and, for the first time ever, explicitly
considered the immediate purpose of a search.'0 Concerned with the
extensive involvement of police and prosecutors in the drafting and
implementation of the hospital's search policy, five justices defined
the immediate aim of the program as the collection of evidence for
law enforcement purposes, thereby disqualifying the searches from
special needs protection." This Recent Development posits that the
Court's decision in Ferguson v. City of Charleston effectively signals
the end of liberal applications of the doctrine of special needs,
especially where it is used as a justification for law enforcement
searches.
At least two persuasive reasons support the assertion that
Ferguson curtailed the doctrine of special needs. First, the immediate
purpose inquiry developed in Ferguson explicitly changed the law by
making suspect any warrantless searches related to law enforcement.'2
Second, Ferguson, read in context, highlights two important trends
that are narrowing the doctrine. The first trend is a more scrutinous
8. Id. at 70-73.
9. IM at 86-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Prior cases did not distinguish
between the immediate purpose and the ultimate goal of a search; however, the Court
always considered the ultimate goal of the searches. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. United
States, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (identifying the governmental concern as deterring drug
use by our nation's school children); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
620 (1989) (identifying the relevant need as regulating the conduct of railway employees
to promote the safety of the traveling public); Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (identifying the compelling government need as deterring drug use
among potential promotion candidates in the United States Customs Service and
preventing promotion of drug users to these positions); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
875 (1986) (identifying the governmental need as running and maintaining a probation
system to promote the protection of the probationer and the safety and welfare of the
public).
10. There is a significant difference between the ultimate goal and immediate
purpose. As the majority notes, "[w]hile the ultimate goal of the program may well have
been to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes in order to reach that goal." Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83. The threat of law
enforcement was "a means to an end." Id at 84. Thus, the majority's inquiry focused on
the way in which the defendants achieved their ultimate goal. See id.
11. See iL at 82-83.
12. The involvement of law enforcement proved especially bothersome to the
Ferguson majority. See id at 82-86 (expressing displeasure that law enforcement was so
heavily involved in the Ferguson search). Certainly, if one takes nothing else from
Ferguson, one should pay close attention to the cautionary language of footnote twenty.
Id at 83 n.20 ("[T]he extensive entanglement of law enforcement cannot be justified by
reference to legitimate needs.").
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analysis of the recent searches ruled upon by the Court-in Ferguson
and Chandler v. Miller,1 3 the most recent special needs cases, the
majorities implicitly redefined the doctrine of special needs. 4 The
second trend is the shifting opinions of the personnel of the Court;
the doctrine of special needs is presently unpopular with enough
members of the Court to render it dormant. When one considers
these express and implied changes in special needs jurisprudence, it is
evident that the doctrine is much weaker after Ferguson.
Ferguson involved the arrest and prosecution of several pregnant
drug users.'5 In South Carolina, one who mistreats a viable fetus
commits a crime, 6 and is subject to prosecution under the state child
abuse statute. 7 Accordingly, a woman who ingests cocaine during the
third trimester of her pregnancy can be prosecuted for child neglect.' 8
Staff members from the Medical University of South Carolina
learned of such prosecutions and contacted the Charleston County
Solicitor to inquire whether he anticipated similar prosecutions in
Charleston and to offer the hospital's assistance. 9 Responding to this
inquiry, the Solicitor organized a "joint interagency task force" that
included representatives from the Solicitor's office, the Charleston
13. 520 U.S. 309 (1997).
14. Ferguson added the immediate purpose analysis. The Supreme Court, 2001
Term-Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 334 (2001). While some believe that this
new analysis is unworkable, see id., this author respectfully disagrees. Chandler required
the governmental need to be more substantial than had previous cases. Chandler, 520 U.S.
at 318 (requiring that the special need be "substantial"); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619
(requiring the government to show a "special" need beyond the normal need for law
enforcement); George M. Dery III, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy than
Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of the Fourth
Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 87-88 (1998) (arguing that
Chandler required a more substantial need than previous cases); William J. Stuntz,
Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553,
554 (1992) (writing before Chandler and arguing that a low level of scrutiny applied to
special needs searches); Joy L. Ames, Note, Chandler v. Miller: Redefining "Special
Needs" for Suspicionless Drug Testing Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 AKRON L. REV.
273, 289 (1997) (indicating that Chandler eliminated much of the subjectivity that
previously existed in special needs jurisprudence).
15. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
16. South Carolina law recognizes a viable fetus as a person. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 2001); Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779-81 (S.C.
1997) (holding that the term "person" in the South Carolina's child abuse statute includes
a viable fetus).
17. § 20-7-50.
18. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779-83 (holding that a woman who ingested cocaine during
the third trimester of pregnancy could be charged with child neglect).
19. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No.
99-936).
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Police Department, and the hospital.2 ° The task force adopted a
policy designed to compel pregnant drug users to seek substance
abuse education and treatment by threatening them with arrest and
prosecution 1 According to proponents of the policy, the "threat of
law enforcement intervention... provided the necessary 'leverage' to
make the policy effective." 22
The hospital reported several pregnant women who sought
obstetrical care and tested positive for cocaine in an urinalysis
conducted pursuant to the policy; these women were arrested and
some were prosecuted.' Ten of the women who were arrested
brought an action in federal court against the hospital officials who
drafted and implemented the policy,24 alleging that the policy violated
their Fourth Amendment 5 right against unreasonable searches 6 The
defendants argued that the searches were reasonable as a matter of
law because they served a special non-law-enforcement need.27
20. Id. The task force also included representatives from the Department of Social
Services and the Charleston County Substance Abuse Commission. Brief for
Respondents at 7, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936).
21. Brief for Respondents at 7-10, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
(No. 99-936).
22. 1& at 8. The hospital tested women who met the following criteria: no prenatal
care, lack of prenatal care after twenty-four weeks gestation, incomplete prenatal care,
abruptrio placentae, intrauterine fetal death, preterm labor (of no obvious cause), IUGR
(intrauterine growth retardation of no obvious cause), previously known drug or alcohol
abuse, and unexplained congenital anomalies. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71 (citing Brief for
Petitioner at A-53 to A-54). The policy further established a chain of custody to follow
when obtaining and testing the urine samples, "presumably to make sure that the results
could be used in subsequent criminal proceedings." Id. at 72. Whether law enforcement
became involved depended on when a particular patient tested positive. If the patient
tested positive while pregnant, she was advised to seek substance abuse counseling, and
reported to the police only if she failed to follow up with that treatment. Id. If she tested
positive while in labor, she was immediately reported to the police and arrested shortly
after giving birth. Brief for Respondents at 8, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67
(2001) (No. 99-936).
The policy also sets forth the offenses with which a woman who tested positive
might be charged. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72. For the first twenty-seven weeks of the
pregnancy, the State could charge the mother with simple possession; after twenty-eight
weeks the charge became possession and distribution to a person under the age of
eighteen; and if the woman tested positive during labor, she could be charged with child
neglect. Id.
23. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
24. 1d
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause ....").
26. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
27. Id. at 81-83 (reporting the ultimate goal of the program to be "to get the women
in question into substance abuse treatment and off drugs").
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Although the district court judge rejected this defense, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendants because it found that the
plaintiffs had consented to the searches.28 With one judge dissenting,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the verdict without reaching the question
of consent because it believed that the searches were reasonable as a
matter of law under the "special needs" doctrine.29
The United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment prevented the hospital from reporting the urinalysis
results to the police when the hospital conducted the urinalysis
without a warrant or probable cause, pursuant to the policy
developed by the task force. ° In striking down the policy, however,
the majority did not resort to the traditional special needs balancing
test that the Court used in previous cases involving searches
conducted without a warrant and probable cause.31 The traditional
test balanced the government's interests against the privacy interests
of the individuals searched. 2 Instead, the majority did something that
the Court had never done before: it distinguished between the
immediate purpose and the ultimate goal of the search.33 Five
28. Id at 73-74.
29. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 477-79 (4th Cir. 1999). Specifically,
two of the three judges found that determining the number of pregnancies affected by
cocaine use constituted a "special need beyond normal law enforcement goals," that
testing the urine of expecting mothers was an "effective method" of advancing this need,
and that the intrusion suffered by the women was "minimal." Id at 479.
30. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85-86.
31. Id. at 76-81; see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660-64 (1995)
(holding that a school's interest in curbing school-wide drug related misconduct in student-
athletes outweighed the privacy expectations of student-athletes, which were diminished
as a result of participation in a highly-regulated school athletic program); Nat'l Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (holding that the government has a
compelling interest in testing drug enforcement officials where individualized suspicion
would not be possible); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989)
(holding that the government's interest in ensuring the safety of the traveling public
outweighed the privacy interest of railway workers, which were diminished as a result of
working in a highly-regulated industry).
32. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-64 (1995) (applying
this test to uphold a random urine screening program in a public school). The rationale
and effectiveness of the search comprise the government's interests. See id. at 661-64.
The intrusiveness of the search factors into the privacy of the individual. See id. at 658-60;
see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 476 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the
traditional test).
33. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83 (recognizing the ultimate goal was to get the women
into drug treatment, but the immediate objective was to generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes); id. at 87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("The distinction
[between ultimate goal and immediate purpose that] the Court makes... lacks foundation
in our special needs cases."). Hence, the majority made a distinction between the end and
the means to achieve that end. Id. at 83-84. If the end could be described as the
protection of the woman and the unborn child, the majority expressed concern with the
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Justices decided that because "the immediate objective of the
searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes,"34
deciding the case on the basis of special needs was inappropriate.
Ferguson's restriction of the special needs doctrine followed a
trend of judicial decisions that supported the doctrine. The doctrine
is a judicially created exception 6 to the general rule that searches
require a warrant37  to be constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 8 In a special needs situation, the Court balances the
public and private interests. 9 Special needs exist where the privacy
means-arrest and prosecution-by which the state achieved its end. Id. The policy
developed by the hospital and law enforcement primarily addressed the means. Id. The
majority viewed this distinction as critical because "law enforcement involvement always
serves some broader social purpose or objective" and defining a search in terms of its
ultimate, rather than immediate, goal would immunize "virtually any nonconsensual
suspicionless search." Id. at 84. However, if the Court examines means, which will usually
be a search, rather than ends, which will usually be the broad reason for conducting the
search, as the relevant needs, then very few needs are likely to appear special. See infra
notes 81-86 and accompanying text; The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Leading Cases, 115
HARV. L. REV. 306, 329 (2001) (noting that the majority opinion distinguishes between
the immediate purpose and ultimate goal of the search in Ferguson).
34. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83.
35. Id. at 79-85.
36. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (recognizing an exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirement where "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable").
37. The Fourth Amendment has two clauses: the first clause prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the second clause lists some general requirements for warrants.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 324 (2001). The Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been an
ongoing exercise in determining which of the clauses governs the other. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment, First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994); Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1471-75 (1985);
Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara
and Terr, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383, 383-85 (1998). The Court has, however, traditionally
expressed a preference for a warrant. See Minnesota v. Dickenson, 508 U.S. 366, 372
(1993); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 454 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Therefore, it is often
stated that the general rule is that a warrant is required absent an exception to the warrant
rule. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) ("[lIt is a cardinal principle
that 'searches conducted outside of the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge
or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specially established and well-delineated exceptions."); see also Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) ("Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches
of dwellings, no less could be required where intrusions into the body are concerned").
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
makes the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961) (holding that state government searches must comply with the Fourth
Amendment).
39. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (holding that such special needs did exist where privacy
interests were minimal because railway employees work in a highly regulated industry
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interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where the
requirement of individualized suspicion places some important 0
governmental interest in jeopardy. 1
Prior to 1997, the Court applied the special needs balancing test 2
to both traditional searches of homes and people.43 For example, in
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,M Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion
emphasized that a school principal could search the purse of a student
with a diminished expectation of privacy and the public interest in a safe transit system is
high).
40. The specific definition of "important" governmental interest has changed over
time. This Recent Development asserts that the Court in Chandler v. Miller raised the
standard necessary for finding a special need. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying
text; see also Dery, supra note 14, at 87-88 (arguing that the Chandler majority imposed a
higher burden on the government by requiring a "substantial" need instead of merely the
traditional "special" need).
41. Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (holding that
urinalysis drug-screening of U.S. Customs employees was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment given the government's compelling interest in patrolling the country's
borders and the need to ensure the integrity of its agents who constantly interact with drug
smugglers).
42. The merits of resolving Fourth Amendment issues on the basis of a case-by-case
balancing test remain the subject of dispute. Perhaps balancing tests are inadequate to
ensure constitutional liberties. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,394 (1974) (arguing that this places too much power in
police, whom the courts trust). Additionally, it is questionable whether courts should
undertake balancing tests given that a court is ill-suited to balance competing interests.
See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 49 (1988) (arguing that courts are ill-suited to
balance competing interests). On the other hand, courts may use flexible balancing tests
to provide appropriate guidance for law enforcement. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright
Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 227, 256 (1984) (arguing that
static bright-line tests are unnecessary in Fourth Amendment cases and that case-by-case
rulings can establish an effective "dialogue" between courts and the police). One may
hypothesize that the difficulties presented in balancing the high interests involved in
Ferguson led to the Court's reluctance to conduct a special needs balancing test. See
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) ("[W]e note that the invasion of
privacy is far more substantial than in those [previous] cases."); see also Evans McMillon,
The Case Against Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women: The Legal and Public
Policy Implications, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 227, 230-32 (1998) (discussing the
serious privacy implications of urinalysis and blood testing of pregnant women and
identifying concern for the child as a serious interest); Warren Richey, Women's Privacy v.
Safety of Unborn, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 4,2000, at 2 (discussing the competing
interests in Ferguson).
43. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347-48 (1985) (upholding a search of
student's purse); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 711, 724-26 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(upholding a search by a government hospital administrator of a doctor-employee's office
files); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-77 (1987) (upholding the search of a
probationer's home by a probation officer); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,702 (1987)
(upholding two police officers' searches of a junkyard for stolen cars while enforcing a
general business licensing requirement).
44. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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for drug paraphernalia without reasonable suspicion because the need
for discipline and order in schools gives rise to special needs beyond
the normal need for law enforcement.45 Likewise, in O'Connor v.
Ortega4 6 a plurality held that government employers and supervisors
could conduct warrantless searches of employees' desks and offices
without probable cause because of the special need for government
employers and supervisors to complete work in a prompt and efficient
manner.4 7 Similarly, in Griffin v. WisconsinI the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a probation officer's search of a probationer's
home following a tip by a police officer, despite the officer's lack of a
warrant or probable cause. The Court determined that supervising a
probationer for the safety and welfare of the public constituted a
special need that outweighed the diminished privacy expectations of a
person under the state's supervision.49
Moreover, the Court has applied the doctrine of special needs in
cases that involved the screening of urine for the presence of illegal
drugs.50  The collection and testing of urine by the government
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.5 1  The Court,
however, has upheld warrantless urine testing of customs officials, 52
railway employees,53 and student athletes54 for the presence of illegal
drugs under the special needs doctrine.
45. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); see Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 74-75
n.7 (indicating that the Court subsequently adopted Justice Blackmun's language and
rationale in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (plurality opinion); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); and Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
665 (1995)).
46. 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 728-29.
48. 483 U.S. 868 (1986).
49. Id. at 875.
50. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53, 665 (1995)
(upholding random, suspicionless drug testing of student athletes); Nat'l Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (upholding random, suspicionless drug
testing of candidates for promotion in U.S. Customs Service); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (upholding drug testing for rail workers
involved in accidents).
51. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 ("Because it is clear that the collection and
testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree,
that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.") (footnote
omitted).
52. Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,679 (1989) (holding that the
government has a compelling interest in testing drug officers where individualized
suspicion would not be possible).
53. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (holding that the government interest in ensuring the
safety of the traveling public outweighed the privacy interests of rail workers, which were
diminished as a result of working in a highly regulated industry).
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After upholding all of these searches under the doctrine of
special needs, the Court, in Chandler v. Miller,55 signaled that the
doctrine has limits.5 6 In Chandler, the Court struck down mandatory
drug screening for candidates of certain state political offices in
Georgia. 7 The Court held that the government had the burden of
proving a "substantial need" for the drug testing. 8 According to the
Court, the State failed to demonstrate a substantial need because the
testing could not achieve its stated goals of detecting drug use among
office holders and preventing them from irresponsibly discharging
their political duties.5 9 Moreover, the Chandler court deviated from
past special needs cases because it forced the government to show a
"substantial need."'  Thus, Chandler represents a significant
54. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (holding that a school's
interest in curbing school-wide drug-related misconduct led by student athletes
outweighed the privacy expectations of student athletes, which were diminished because
of participation in a highly regulated school program such as extramural athletics).
55. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
56. Commentators have suggested that before Chandler, the Court allowed the
doctrine of special needs to get out of control by applying it in situations where it should
not have applied. See Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment:
An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 529, 563 (1997) (arguing that the "special needs" balancing test permits distortion of
Fourth Amendment strictures); Dery, supra note 14, at 103 (arguing that the "special
needs" balancing test invaded traditional privacy rights); David J. Gottlieb, Drug Testing,
Collective Suspicion, and a Fourth Amendment Out of Balance: A Reply to Professor
Howard, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 27-28 (1997) (arguing that Acton is inconsistent
with the intent of the Fourth Amendment); Michael W. Kier, Comment, Jones v. Murray:
Allowing the Government to Get Blood From a Stone, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 635, 635
(1992) (arguing that the court has recently drained the lifeblood from the Fourth
Amendment) (citations omitted); Jennifer L. Malin, Comment, Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton: Further Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 469, 489
(1996) ("[T]he Court has engaged in ad hoc balancing which has failed to guard against
arbitrary searches and has expanded this 'special needs' doctrine beyond its intended
scope.").
57. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318-23. Specifically, the Chandler majority struck down the
drug screens for two reasons. First, the government could allege no existing drug problem
among officeholders; therefore, there was no special need to conduct warrantless blanket
searches. Id. at 318-19. Second, assuming arguendo that a special need existed to detect
drug use among candidates for political office, the search could not achieve detection
because (1) it took place sixty days before a candidate qualified to be placed on the ballot,
and (2) it screened for drugs that exit the body within thirty days.
58. Id. at 318.
59. Id. at 318-19. The requirement failed to identify drug-using candidates because
most illegal drug users could merely abstain for a month prior to the drug screens in order
to avoid detection. Id. at 320.
60. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (noting that a
search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional if special needs exist that
make the warrant and probable cause impractical); Dery, supra note 14, at 87-88
(" 'Special' no longer meant a justification 'apart from the regular needs of law
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departure from the previous special needs cases because it became
the first case to limit the doctrine by increasing the required need and
by making the usefulness of the search an issue.61
Ferguson further limits the doctrine of special needs. Unlike
previous courts, the Ferguson court analyzed the immediate and
ultimate goals of the testing policy.62  Upon identifying the
"immediate purpose" of the program as the generation of evidence
for law enforcement purposes, the Court held that the special needs
balancing test did not apply and that the Fourth Amendment should
be applied strictly.63 This departure from precedent represented a
significant addition to the law: the immediate purpose inquiry.
Ferguson creates two implications. First, Ferguson creates a new
test. Courts must now analyze the immediate and ultimate goals of a
warrantless search and declare the search unconstitutional if one of
those goals is to aid law enforcement. The doctrine of special needs
was thus severely limited in cases involving law enforcement.64
enforcement' .... Now, the government's 'need' had to be 'substantial,' indeed, big
enough to 'override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to
suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion.' ").
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg claimed that the Court's "precedents establish
that the proffered need must be substantial-important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion." Chandler, 520 U.S. at
318-19.
61. In Chandler, the Court purported to apply the traditional special needs balancing
test. Id. at 313-14 (explaining that the Court was applying the test used in Skinner).
Accordingly, the search would only be constitutional where the privacy interests were
minimal and the governmental interest would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion. ML (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 624 (1989)). The Court found the governmental interest lacking because Georgia
could assert no reasonable rationale for a special needs search because it could allege no
drug problem among office holders, id, at 319, and because the search policy employed
would be ineffective at identifying the targeted drug users given that the drug could be
easily eliminated from the candidate's system prior to the screening. d. at 320. The Court
did, however, note that the testing method was "relatively noninvasive" and, therefore,
unintrusive. Id. at 318. Accordingly, the testing policy in Chandler would have withstood
scrutiny but for the lack of governmental need. Id.
62. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-83 (2001) ("While the ultimate
goal of the program may well have been to get the women in question into substance
abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to generate
evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal.") (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 86.
64. Prior to Ferguson, the Court had approved the search in Griffin. Although that
search was termed an administrative search, it undoubtedly served a law enforcement end.
See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (identifying the search as an administrative
search). A police officer reported a probationer's possession of a gun in his home to
probation officers who were not assigned to that probationer. Id. at 871. The probation
officers searched the probationer's home and found the gun. Id. at 872. The state
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Second, the doctrine's inability to command a majority in two
consecutive cases indicates that the once common doctrine is now
disfavored.65
The new "immediate purpose" test introduced in Ferguson limits
the application of the special needs doctrine in future cases involving
law enforcement.' In addition to the heightened burden the
government need must meet, Ferguson adds that the need may not
serve a law enforcement end.67 The Court's recent displeasure with
special needs searches involving law enforcement is best understood
when the Ferguson holding is contrasted with the holding in Griffin v.
Wisconsin.' In Griffin, two probation officers conducted a
warrantless search of a probationer's home pursuant to the state's
probation statute requiring "reasonable grounds. 69  Undoubtedly,
the Griffin search served a law enforcement end as evidenced by the
facts that neither of the searching officers served as the probationer's
assigned probation officer70 and they devised the search in close
collaboration with police officers, who informed the probation
officers that the paroled felon possessed a gun in his home.71
Moreover, they gave the gun to law enforcement officials, who used it
as evidence to prosecute the probationer. 2 Nevertheless, the Court
held that supervision of the probationer constituted a special need
that permitted the State to infringe upon his individual privacy
rights.73
ultimately used the gun as evidence to arrest and prosecute the probationer for violating
his parole. Id. Ergo, the search served the law enforcement ends of identifying, detaining
and prosecuting a lawbreaker. See also Michael R. Beeman, Comment, Investigating Child
Abuse: The Fourth Amendment and Investigatory Home Visits, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1034,
1049 (1989) (stating that the purpose of the specific search was obtain evidence of criminal
activity); Andrea Lewis, Comment, Drug Testing: Can Privacy Interests Be Protected
Under the "Special Needs" Doctrine?, 56 BROoK. L. REV 1013, 1035 (1990) (arguing that
narrow application of the phrase "need for law enforcement" allows for broad application
of the special needs doctrine).
65. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 129-37 (discussing relevant special needs cases).
66. See The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 332
(2001) (indicating that after Ferguson a special needs case must arise from a purpose other
than law enforcement and that Ferguson "adds bite" to this requirement).
67. The Court was not always so unwilling to afford special needs protection to a law
enforcement search. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
68. 483 U.S. 868 (1986).
69. Id. at 871.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 870.
73. Id. at 875. Furthermore, the Court decided that, given the need to monitor
recently released felons efficiently, requiring a warrant would be completely impractical to
the functioning of the probation system. Id. at 877-80.
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If Griffin indeed permitted special needs to serve a law
enforcement end, Ferguson very likely reversed this holding, at least
partially.74 A hypothetical also underscores this point: what if Griffin
was decided under Ferguson's reasoning instead of fifteen years
earlier? As evidenced by the officers' search for a firearm, the
immediate goal of the search was to obtain evidence for law
enforcement purposes.75 Once the Court made that threshold
determination, a special needs analysis would be inappropriate under
Ferguson, and the search would be deemed unreasonable without a
warrant or probable cause.7 6 As this hypothetical demonstrates, in
the wake of Ferguson, before balancing the competing interests, a
74. The Court did not characterize the search in Griffin as a criminal search; rather,
the majority deemed it an administrative search. See id. at 872-73 (discussing the law
applicable to regulatory schemes and the regulatory scheme in Griffin). However, the
search sought to investigate a lead from the police and to obtain evidence for the arrest
and prosecution of the probationer. The majority reasoned that because the probationer
was a felon being punished in an alternative manner to incarceration, he was subject to the
rules governing searches conducted by the department of corrections. lId at 873-75.
Further, because a probation officer conducted the search, the administrative rules of the
department of corrections governed. See id at 875 (discussing how the search's
reasonableness depended on Wisconsin's interpretation of its probation statute).
However, this reasoning does not take account of the fact that probation officers, not
including the officer assigned to the probationer, searched the probationer at the behest of
law enforcement. See icL at 871-72 (indicating that the probation officers acted pursuant
to a tip by police). When one considers these facts, the search seems much less like a
routine search by the department of corrections, and much more like a typical law
enforcement search.
75. See supra notes 64, 74; see also Beeman, supra note 64, at 1049 (describing the
search in Griffin as a law enforcement search).
76. Griffin can be distinguished from Ferguson because Griffin involved the search of
a convicted felon who was still under state supervision, whereas the women in Ferguson
were not. This distinction is immaterial, however, because the immediate purpose inquiry
does not take privacy expectations into account. Of course, the women in Ferguson
enjoyed a higher expectation of privacy than convicted felons still under state supervision.
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (noting that the privacy interest
implicated in Ferguson is greater than in other urinalysis cases). This observation is beside
the point because an immediate purpose analysis occurs before the privacy interests of the
individual are balanced against the state's interest. The Ferguson majority did not
expressly address privacy expectations, but rather addressed the purpose for which the
State collected the evidence. See id. at 82-84 (discussing the immediate and ultimate goals
of the urine screenings in Ferguson). Because the State designed a search with the
immediate purpose of arresting and prosecuting the women, the majority struck down the
search. lId at 82-86. However, it is unlikely that law enforcement contributed any more
searches that resulted in the arrests in Ferguson than did the police officer who
encouraged probation officers not assigned to a particular probationer to search the
probationer's house without a warrant and probable cause. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 871 (1987) (discussing the facts of the Griffin search). The distinction might be
more significant if the Court had actually conducted a balancing test. See, e.g., Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (holding a search unreasonable where no special needs
were present).
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court must consider whether an immediate goal of the program is to
obtain evidence for law enforcement purposes.77
Similar to the special needs analysis, the "immediate purpose"
analysis is fact intensive, and the result turns on how a court weighs
the evidence 8.7  Depending upon which facts are emphasized or
downplayed, a court decides how heavily law enforcement affected
the search at hand. For example, the dissent in Ferguson asserted
that the immediate goal of the defendants in Ferguson was to obtain
substance abuse treatment for drug-abusing pregnant women.79 In
fact, the district court found that the relevant goal of the search "was
not to arrest patients but to facilitate their treatment and protect both
the mother and unborn child."8 The Supreme Court majority, on the
77. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83. Of course, an argument exists that Ferguson did
nothing to limit the "special needs" doctrine. See The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-
Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 334 (2001) (positing that Ferguson might not
hinder the involvement of law enforcement as much as it first appears because the
distinction between an ultimate goal and an immediate purpose is exceptionally flimsy);
see also Charles F. Williams, Return of the Fourth Amendment, 8 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. Cr.
CAS. 442, 444-45 (2001) (focusing on Ferguson's holding that the hospital's interest in
using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter drug use in pregnant women did not justify a
departure from the general requirement of a warrant and not mentioning any other
detrimental effects to law enforcement searches). Such an argument presumes that the
presence of law enforcement in the implementation and enforcement of the drug testing
policy presents the only significant difference between Ferguson and previous cases. See
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). However, such an
argument conflicts with the decision in Griffin. See id. at 100-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). The immediate purpose of the search in
Griffin undoubtedly was to serve the needs of law enforcement. Ia at 101 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[]n Griffin, even more than [in Ferguson] police were involved in the search
from the very beginning."). Moreover, as Justice Scalia's dissent points out, the special
needs doctrine "was developed and is ordinarily employed, precisely to enable searches by
law enforcement officials who, of course, ordinarily have a law enforcement objective." Id.
at 100 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Therefore, Ferguson, likely indicates an erosion in the
acceptable uses of the "special needs" doctrine.
78. The district court found that the Ferguson searches were not conducted for
independent reasons, but were instead intended to be shared with the police. Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 73-74. Hence, to the district court, the presence of law enforcement was
emphasized. See id. The Fourth Circuit majority, on the other hand, concerned itself with
the benevolent goals of the search and viewed the law enforcement involvement as an
acceptable means to an end. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 477-79 &
n.7 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the pregnancy complications caused by maternal cocaine
use). The Supreme Court majority emphasized facts demonstrating the heavy
involvement of the police. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72 (discussing how the policy
provided notification of the police when patients tested positive, procedures for
maintaining a chain of custody, and the range of possible criminal charges).
79. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the district court's finding
of fact that the goal of the search was to promote substance abuse treatment in order to
protect the mother and unborn child).
80. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the district court's findings).
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other hand, emphasized different facts in deciding that the immediate
purpose of the search was to facilitate the arrest and prosecution of
the pregnant women.s' Specifically, the Court examined the
hospital's policy, devoting significant attention to establishing a chain
of custody, the range of possible criminal charges, the logistics of
police notification of arrests, and the fact that police and prosecutors
were heavily involved in the administration of the policy. 3
Marshalling the facts in a way that indicated heavy law enforcement
objectives, the majority opened the door to the argument that if any
evidence indicates that a search may result in an arrest, the policy has
the "immediate purpose" of obtaining evidence for law enforcement
purposes.n
Since most searches aim to find some kind of illegal activity, the
fact-specific immediate purpose inquiry could be used to strike down
searches that traditionally were approved.84 Consider, for example,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,'5 in which the
Court found that the governmental special need of protecting the
travelling public outweighed the privacy interests of rail workers
implicated by urinalysis drug screenings. 6 The dissent argued that
the drug testing policy in Skinner failed to prevent prosecutors from
obtaining the urine samples drawn from rail workers and using them
to prosecute illegal drug cases; but rather, the regulations "appear[ed]
to invite" such conductY Thus, if certain facts were emphasized, a
court could characterize the immediate purpose of urine screens as
obtaining evidence for law enforcement purposes. If the Court
viewed the immediate purpose of the search as obtaining evidence for
the arrest and prosecution of the rail workers, then a special needs
balancing test would be inappropriate. Hence, Ferguson represents a
significant departure from prior cases because it added a subjective,
fact-intensive inquiry that can be used to subvert the application of
the doctrine. A special needs balancing test may never be conducted
81. Id- at 83-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 100 (Scalia J., dissenting) (arguing that the only possible rationale for the
Court's holding is that "the addition of law-enforcement-related purposes to a legitimate
medical purpose destroys applicability of the 'special-needs' doctrine").
84. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the special needs doctrine is typically
employed by law enforcement officials with law enforcement objectives).
85. 489 U.S. 602,634 (1989).
86. Id.
87. 1d at 650 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the possibility of arrest and
prosecution was significant).
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when the immediate goal of a search is linked to the goals of law
enforcement.
Moreover, Ferguson could extend beyond the law enforcement
arena. The Ferguson majority analyzed the immediate purpose of the
search and moved away from prior cases that looked to the ultimate
goal of the search in question. This change is significant because the
ultimate goal of a given search will often appear much more laudable
than the immediate purpose. Consider Justice Kennedy's examples:
he claims that under the majority's immediate purpose analysis, the
immediate purpose in Vernonia would be gathering evidence of drug
use in the Nation's school children. 8s Clearly, the goal of gathering
evidence is far less compelling that the goal of deterring drug use.
Accordingly, a relevant need defined in terms of the immediate
purpose of the search is less likely to survive the Court's scrutiny than
the benevolent ultimate goals the Court accepted in the past.89
Furthermore, the weakening of the doctrine is apparent in the
tone and dicta of the recent cases. The Court is implicitly moving
away from the special needs doctrine as the doctrine falls into
disfavor with several members of the Court. Ferguson is the second
consecutive case 90 that struck down a special needs search.
Determining whether these cases represent a narrowing of the
doctrine or simply an abstention requires an analysis of the language
in Chandler and Ferguson.
The doctrine of special needs has been altered both times it has
faced the Court.91 Prior to Chandler, the government only needed to
88. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
89. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-22 (identifying the relevant need as the government's
interest in regulating the conduct of railway employees for safety reasons); Nat'l Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989) (identifying the relevant need as
deterring drug use among U.S. customs officials in sensitive and potentially compromising
situations); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646 (identifying the relevant need as deterring drug use
among the Nation's school children).
90. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 307 (1997) was the first case to strike down a special
needs search.
91. See id. at 318 (rejecting drug screenings of candidates for Georgia's state political
offices where the government could not show a substantial need); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at
82-84 (using the immediate purpose analysis to reject urine screening of pregnant women
seeking obstetrical care at a state hospital); Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomized
Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258, 281 (2000)
(arguing that the current Justices are willing to tighten the requirements for a finding of
special needs as evidenced in Chandler v. Miller); The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-
Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REv. 306,332 (2001) (indicating that Ferguson conducted an
immediate purpose analysis).
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show a special need. 2 Chandler's holding, however, demanded the
showing of a "substantial need."93 This distinction is quite significant
because it requires a higher showing by the government.94
Furthermore, the Court struck down the statutorily mandated search,
partly because it could not achieve its ultimate goal,95 broadly defined
as preventing political officeholders in Georgia from "jeopardizing
the discharge of public functions. '96  In Ferguson, the Court
considered the immediate purpose,' whereas prior to Ferguson only
the ultimate goal of the search was relevant.98  Once an expansive
doctrine, the notion of a special need emerged from Chandler and
Ferguson in a much weaker form.99 Hence, after Chandler, a search
actually had to achieve its goal in order to be constitutional."°
Ferguson further deflated the doctrine by requiring a questionable
search to pass an additional test. Now, not only must the need be
substantial as well as substantially addressed by the search, but the
92. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22 (stating that the government needed to show
a special need); see also Dodson, supra note 91, at 259 (identifying the pre-Chandler
special needs cases as sweeping); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power,
and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553,554 (1992) (arguing that the doctrine of
special needs requires such a low showing by the government that any search that is not
"outrageous" is deemed "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment).
93. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (stating that the government must show a "substantial
need" that outweighs both the candidate's interest in privacy and the "Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion").
94. Ames, supra note 14, at 291. Specifically, the government must show an actual
problem that is not merely symbolic such as having a tough stance on drugs, and public
safety must genuinely be at risk. Id. at 291-93.
95. The Chandler majority did not distinguish between the immediate purpose and
the ultimate goal of the search. It accepted the State's argument that the goal of the
program was to prevent officeholders from engaging in conduct injurious to the public,
and struck down the search because it could not achieve that goal. Chandler, 520 U.S. at
319-20. However, this type of analysis may have opened the door to a Ferguson-type
immediate purpose analysis. After all, the Court looked at the ultimate goal of the drug
screens and then struck down a search poorly designed to achieve that goal. Id Perhaps
the Court believed that the search was designed to serve another purpose.
96. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
97. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 82-84 (2001).
98. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22 (identifying the relevant need as the
government's interest in promoting railway safety).
99. See Dodson, supra note 91, at 259 (identifying the pre-Chandler special needs
cases as sweeping); Stuntz, supra note 92, at 554 (arguing that the doctrine of special needs
requires such a low showing by the government that any search that is not "outrageous" is
deemed "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment); Ames, supra note 14, at 289
(indicating that pre-Chandler cases allowed much subjectivity in the application of the
doctrine of special needs); see also supra, note 60.
100. Id.
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immediate purpose of search in question is subject to review as
well.0 1
Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the current
Supreme Court disfavors the doctrine of special needs, such that it is
unlikely to command future majorities. Although the doctrine has its
proponents on the current court, the support of certain justices has
waivered. 1°c Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and O'Connor once supported
101. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-84 (2001).
102. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas are still willing to vote in
favor of the doctrine of special needs. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 98-104 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, Ci. and Thomas, J.) (arguing that there was a special
need); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, not joined by Scalia, J.
and Thomas, J.) (arguing that there was a special need); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (Rehnquist Ci., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., joining in the opinion
of the Court) (analyzing the need to curb the problem of drug abuse in the nation's
schools is a special need); Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(identifying the need to prevent drug interdiction officers from using drugs and
impracticability of monitoring them all); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989) (need to protect traveling public); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1986)
(Scalia, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in which Rehnquist, CJ., joined) (finding
that the need to monitor paroled felons is a special need); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 720 (1986) (Rebnquist, C.J., joining in the plurality opinion) (finding the need for
government employers to monitor employees is a special need). Justices Scalia and
Thomas voted against the search in Chandler, 520 U.S. at 307, but voted in favor of special
needs in Ferguson. 532 U.S. at 98-104 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also dissented
in Von Raab because he did not believe that the government had shown an existing
problem that warranted extreme measures. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-87 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Stevens rarely joins in an opinion that endorses "special needs." See
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court) (striking down a
special needs search); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308-23 (joining in the majority opinion
striking down the special needs search); Vernonia School District, 515 U.S. at 666-86
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.) (dissenting from a finding of special
needs); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 890 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a finding of
special needs); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 732-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
J.) (dissenting from a finding of special needs); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-87 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.), Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (refusing to join in a finding of special needs).
Justice Souter never votes in favor of the doctrine of special needs. See Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 69 (joining in an opinion that struck down a special needs search); Chandler,
520 U.S. at 308-23 (joining in an opinion that struck down a special needs search);
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 666-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.).
Justice Kennedy still believes in the doctrine of "special needs" so long as the
search achieves its ultimate goal and does not involve law enforcement. Ferguson, 532
U.S. at 86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (striking down the search because of the
involvement of law enforcement but disagreeing with the majority's special needs
analysis); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308-23 (striking down the search); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at
647 (upholding the special needs search); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-67 (Kennedy, J.,
delivering the opinion of the Court) (finding special needs); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-34
(Kennedy, J., delivering the opinion of the Court) (finding special needs).
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the doctrine but have retracted that support. Consequently, the
doctrine can no longer command five votes in its favor.103
Given her lengthy tenure on the Court, Justice O'Connor's
retreat from her original position in favor of the doctrine is both
noticeable and significant. She agreed that special needs existed in
O'Connor,"° Griffin,10 5 Skinner,"6 and Von Raab,1°7 however, she
withdrew her support from the special needs doctrine in Vernonia,
arguing that a warrant requirement would not jeopardize the search.
Additionally, she expressed discomfort with the broad nature of the
"blanket search" in question1°S She also joined the majorities in
Chandler0 9 and Ferguson"0 that struck down searches predicated
upon the special needs doctrine.
Moreover, there is an even better reason to believe that Justice
O'Connor no longer supports the doctrine of special needs. Namely,
she voted for the search in Griffin."' As previously discussed, the
search in Ferguson is not distinguishable from the search in Griffin in
as much as law enforcement was heavily involved in both searches."
Justice O'Connor voted to strike down the search in Ferguson."1
Therefore, it is likely she changed her position on the doctrine.
Given that the doctrine has fallen into disfavor, it is doubtful that
the doctrine can command a majority in future cases. The skepticism
of the Justices on the Court and the drastic narrowing of the doctrine
in the previous two cases indicates that the special needs exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements is
probably limited to circumstances directly analogous to cases where
special needs have been determined. Thus at present, no new special
needs are likely to emerge.
103. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer agreed that the search in Vernonia was justified on
the basis of special needs, but that the searches in Chandler, 520 U.S. at 307, and Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 75-77, were not. Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in Vernonia in
which she emphasized that her vote hinged on the fact that the urinalysis searches for
drugs only occurred if students participated in certain extracurricular activities.
104. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,720 (1986).
105. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,870-80 (1986).
106. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
107. Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
108. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666-86 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that applying the doctrine would subject millions of school children to
warrantless, blanket searches without any need for suspicion).
109. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 307 (1997).
110. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,69 (2001).
111. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,869 (1986).
112. See supra notes 64 and 70-75.
113. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69.
2002] 1067
1068 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Hence, Ferguson should not be taken lightly by those who study
or practice Fourth Amendment law. While the Court did not
expressly announce that it was weakening the doctrine of special
needs, it did so in a very meaningful way by creating the immediate
purpose inquiry. Moreover, the subtle changes in tone and the votes
in Ferguson confirm an ongoing erosion in the support for the
doctrine among the members of the Court. Policymakers who devise
search policies predicated on the doctrine of special needs would be
wise to scrutinize the immediate purpose of their policies and
eliminate any clear links to law enforcement because the Court is
searching for ways to quietly eliminate the doctrine of special needs.
JOSEPH S. DowDY
